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Agenda items 33, 54, 83 and 121

Prevention of armed conflict

Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects

The rule of law at the national and international levels

Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and other organizations

Security Council
Sixty-eighth year

Identical letters dated 7 February 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Slovakia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

On 10 and 11 December 2012, Slovakia, in its capacity as Chair of the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform, organized a series of events on the United Nations approach to security sector reform. The events were held in cooperation with the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (Department of Peacekeeping Operations) and the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (United Nations Development Programme) and with the support of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. The series of events comprised: (a) the official launch of the first set of Integrated Technical Guidance Notes on Security Sector Reform developed by the inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force; (b) a high-level meeting of the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform; and (c) an expert-level seminar. Member States showed a high level of interest in the events, which generated several recommendations for the United Nations system that have been included in the summary of the Chair on the series (see annex).

In this regard, I have the honour to submit to you the summary of the Chair as the outcome document of the series, and request your kind assistance in issuing the present letter and its annex as a document of the sixty-seventh session of the General Assembly, under items 33, 54, 83 and 121, and as a document of the Security Council, and in distributing it to all Member States.

(*Signed*) František **Ružička**
Ambassador

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Annex to the identical letters dated 7 February 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Slovakia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

The United Nations and security sector reform: high- and expert-level events held in New York on 10 and 11 December 2012, hosted by Slovakia in its capacity as Chair of the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform

Chair's statement

1. On 10 and 11 December 2012, Slovakia, in its capacity as Chair of the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform, hosted a series of events: (a) a reception for the launch of the first set of Integrated Technical Guidance Notes on Security Sector Reform developed by the inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force; (b) a high-level meeting of the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform; and (c) an expert-level seminar. The events were supported by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, the Security Sector Reform Unit of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The overarching objectives of these events were to assess progress in terms of United Nations engagement in supporting security sector reform processes since the first report of the Secretary-General on the topic was issued in January 2008 (A/62/659-S/2008/39) and to provide substantive input for the further development of a comprehensive United Nations approach to security sector reform in the context of the second report of the Secretary-General on the topic, to be issued in 2013.

Launch of the Integrated Technical Guidance Notes on Security Sector Reform

2. The launch of the Integrated Technical Guidance Notes on Security Sector Reform on 10 December brought together approximately 70 representatives of Member States and the United Nations. Hosted by the Permanent Representative of Slovakia to the United Nations, Ambassador František Ružička, at his residence, the event included the delivery of remarks by Deputy Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of Slovakia, Peter Burian and the two co-Chairs of the inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force, Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Dmitry Titov (Department of Peacekeeping Operations) and Assistant Administrator and Director of the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, Jordan Ryan (UNDP). The speakers presented the first volume of the Guidance Notes, which includes an introduction on the United Nations approach to security sector reform and specific guidance notes on national ownership of security sector reform, gender-responsive security sector reform, peace processes and security sector reform, democratic governance of the security sector and United Nations support to national security policymaking and strategy-making processes. The speakers underlined the value of the Guidance Notes as the embodiment of a common United Nations approach to security sector reform that provides staff in the field and at Headquarters with coherent, system-wide guidance on support to security sector reform processes. It was emphasized that the Guidance Notes represent a crucial element in terms of the implementation of the first report of the Secretary-General on security sector reform. The speakers called for the key

messages of the Guidance Notes to be disseminated widely and used systematically in the field. It was also emphasized that the use of the Guidance Notes in the field, including the development of sound monitoring and evaluation practices, would require enhanced resources and continued support by Member States and partners.

Open high-level meeting of the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform

3. The open high-level meeting of the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform, held on the morning of 11 December, was attended by more than 100 representatives of Member States and of the United Nations. The meeting featured keynote addresses by Deputy Minister Burian, Assistant Secretary-General Titov and Assistant Administrator Ryan. These were followed by statements by the Permanent Representatives of Canada, the Netherlands, Nigeria and the Republic of Moldova, and representatives of Argentina, Indonesia, Slovakia, South Africa and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. It provided insights into the United Nations approach to security sector reform to date and Member States' perspectives on priorities for the second report of the Secretary-General on such reform. Particular focus was placed on regional perspectives and partnerships, drawing on the input provided at various regional workshops held in recent years for the Organization's evolving approach to security sector reform. Member States also shared their experiences and lessons identified in supporting the United Nations in security sector reform.

United Nations approach to security sector reform

4. Concerning the evolution of the United Nations approach to security sector reform to date, the Group of Friends recognized that a number of achievements had been made in the areas of field support, normative development and partnerships. In the area of field support, significant progress is visible in the widespread recognition that security sector reform is an essential element of multidimensional peacekeeping operations. This is based on the strengthening of Headquarters and field capacities to deliver coherent support to national and regional security sector reform processes. The inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force and the Security Sector Reform Unit of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations have emerged as centres of excellence on such reform. The development of a roster of security sector reform experts, which is managed by the Unit, has increased access to rapidly deployable civilian experts. Extensive outreach and consultations with national, regional and international partners have led to the development of partnerships and to an enhanced understanding of the basic principles and norms that underpin the normative and operational roles of the United Nations with regard to security sector reform. In the area of normative development, the development of the Integrated Technical Guidance Notes on Security Sector Reform was raised as a significant achievement, which represents a contribution to the implementation of a key component of the first report of the Secretary-General. Moreover, it was highlighted that the Guidance Notes represent a body of United Nations experience and, as such, are a reflection of empirically based good practices. The priority is now to operationalize the Notes through coordinated action and enhanced support in the field. Finally, it was recognized that partnerships are essential for ensuring the relevance and sustainability of security sector reform efforts on the ground. Much progress has been made, notably with the African Union through the development of the capacity-building partnership between the African Union Commission and the

Department of Peacekeeping Operations. However, there is still a need to strengthen partnerships with other regional and subregional organizations. This includes the need to engage with organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the East African Community, the Economic Community of West African States and other regional economic communities, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (in the Horn of Africa), the Organization of American States, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Southern African Development Community.

Regional perspectives

5. The important roles that regional organizations play in security sector reform were emphasized in the first report of the Secretary-General. Since then, significant work has been undertaken to learn more about regional perspectives on security sector reform, support their capacity development in this area and lay the ground for long-term partnerships where appropriate. In this regard, Member States reflected on the insights derived from numerous regional workshops that had provided opportunities to discuss approaches and identify regional capacities and good practices. Those discussions had also provided important input for the development of the United Nations approach to security sector reform. Notably, a series of three workshops was co-hosted by Slovakia and a Member State from different regions with the assistance of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. The first workshop, on "Enhancing United Nations support for security sector reform in Africa: towards an African perspective", was co-hosted by Slovakia and South Africa and held in Cape Town on 7 and 8 November 2007 (see S/2007/687). This workshop made an important contribution to the first report of the Secretary-General on security sector reform. The second workshop, on "Contributing to the United Nations approach to security sector reform: insights from Latin America and the Caribbean", was co-hosted by Argentina and Slovakia and held in Buenos Aires on 28 and 29 September 2009 (see A/64/530). The third workshop, on "The Role of the United Nations in multidimensional peacekeeping operations and post-conflict peacebuilding: towards an ASEAN perspective", was co-hosted by Indonesia and Slovakia and held in Jakarta on 29 and 30 March 2010 (see A/64/811). In addition, the Government of Canada funded an African regional workshop on security sector reform that was held in March 2009, with support from the Security Sector Reform Unit and in full partnership with the African Union Commission. Since then, numerous other security sector reform-related events with a regional component have been sponsored by Member States. In particular, Nigeria and South Africa, in cooperation with the United Nations, co-hosted two high-level forums and expert seminars on African perspectives on security sector reform, held in 2010 and 2012, respectively. Another high-level event, on "Challenges and opportunities for security sector reform in East Africa", was co-hosted by Slovakia and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and held in Nairobi in October 2012. It was recognized that all these events have shaped the way in which the United Nations perceives its role and supports security sector reform in these regions. They have also provided a rich body of regional experiences and lessons for ongoing reflections on the second report of the Secretary-General.

6. It was acknowledged that the United Nations global framework for security sector reform can be meaningful and sustainable only if it is linked to regional

approaches. Each regional building block can provide an important contribution to the larger framework. Against this background, it was recognized that there is also a need to engage with and learn from experiences gained in broad peacebuilding, development and democratization contexts, where security sector reform is equally relevant. If the United Nations is to be effective, it needs to take into account these contexts and the unique challenges and opportunities they present. The United Nations can, for example, draw on the experiences of Latin American and the Caribbean with regard to addressing people-oriented security or of South-East Asia with regard to supporting confidence-building efforts.

7. It was recognized that a number of the principles that had been identified in the first report of the Secretary-General — and that have been emphasized in the various regional workshops — remained of utmost relevance today. These include strengthening accountability and democratic governance in the security sector, promoting national ownership and enhancing coordination among national and international security sector reform stakeholders. It was observed that the challenge lies in how to operationalize these principles. It was also noted, in this respect, that the Integrated Technical Guidance Notes on national ownership and democratic governance ought to help in addressing some of the challenges to implementation. However, greater emphasis is needed on monitoring and evaluating the progress made by the United Nations in support of the implementation of the principles.

Member State perspectives

8. In addition to continued learning from regional experiences, there is a pressing need to reflect on global challenges, opportunities and trends in the area of security sector reform and the implications for United Nations support to such reform. Several Member States shared their views on important issues that need to be addressed. First, it was recognized that the concept of people-oriented security is essential. Security sector reform efforts need to take into account people's experiences in security and justice, in addition to focusing on State institutions. This means looking at local approaches to security sector reform that are based on greater engagement with communities. Second, the implications of recent policy agendas, such as the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, adopted at the Fourth High-level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, held in Busan, Republic of Korea, in 2011, may be considered. From a security sector reform perspective, this requires supporting country-led and country-owned reforms, as well as reflecting on how to build, not substitute, capacities. Third, the importance of coordination to support security sector reform in a complementary manner must be recognized. In this respect, the development of the Integrated Technical Guidance Notes was raised as a good example of how United Nations inter-agency coordination could lead to tangible outcomes. However, now that the Guidance Notes have been launched, substantial resources need to be dedicated to outreach and training, as well as to monitoring and evaluating their use and, ultimately, their impact in the field. It was underlined that written materials are only as good as the changes reflected in the field.

9. Sustainability and affordability were also identified as key issues. The 2012 public expenditure and needs assessment review of the Liberian security sector, undertaken by the United Nations Mission in Liberia and the World Bank, was cited as an example of an effort to address affordability challenges in the context of transitions. In this respect, it was recognized that long-term funding is essential to ensure financial sustainability and the flexibility required to respond to changes in

complex environments. Long-term funding commitments from both national authorities and their partners need to go beyond quick-win and outcome-oriented approaches to allow for predictability of funding and support national ownership.

10. Finally, participants reiterated the value of the Group of Friends, which brings together Member States with an extremely rich collection of experiences in security sector reform. The organization of meetings of this high-level group was commended for two reasons. First, it enabled Member States to provide input for the second report of the Secretary-General on security sector reform. Second, it marked a revitalization of the Group of Friends as an important platform for dialogue among Member States and a useful interface between Member States and the United Nations system. In this context, South Africa has accepted to become the first rotating co-Chair of the Group of Friends, thus opening the chairmanship up to a Member State from the global South for the first time.

Expert-level seminar on the United Nations and security sector reform

11. The expert-level seminar on "The United Nations and security sector reform" that followed the high-level meeting of the Group of Friends brought together over 50 representatives of Member States and the United Nations and experts. The seminar featured speakers from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UNDP and the Peacebuilding Support Office, as well as experts representing regional networks in Africa (the African Security Sector Network) and Asia (the Asia Consultative Group on Security Sector Reform). The seminar provided for substantive discussion on the key themes to be addressed in the development of the second report of the Secretary-General on security sector reform. The first panel assessed critically the achievements made since the adoption of the first report of the Secretary-General, in 2008, and identified the challenges faced in translating its principles and messages into practice. The second panel explored new trends in the area of security sector reform and how the United Nations should position itself to best respond to those trends.

Challenges of implementation

12. It was recognized that the first report of the Secretary-General was a pioneering endeavour and that a number of key achievements have been made in terms of implementation. First, United Nations capacities at Headquarters and in the field have been reinforced to better respond to the growing demand for security sector reform support from national authorities. The number of requests have increased exponentially over the past five years and are becoming increasingly complex as the dynamics of conflict change and as the United Nations adapts its response to fragility and violence. Second, the inter-agency approach to security sector reform has been strengthened through the work of the Security Sector Reform Task Force. Third, the development of the Integrated Technical Guidance Notes represents a significant achievement in terms of implementing a crucial element of the first report. In this respect, it was noted that the significant work of the Task Force should be commended, in particular its role in the development of the Guidance Notes, which built on the individual comparative advantages of the various members of the Task Force.

13. Despite the notable achievements, it was acknowledged that some challenges in implementing the messages contained in the first report remained. First, the

United Nations was under pressure to provide far-reaching support but it was limited in terms of both human and financial resources. The inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force, for example, relies on extrabudgetary funding, which means that it is not able to meet its full potential as a system-wide coordination and support mechanism. Its secretariat, the Security Sector Reform Unit, also faces resource constraints that make it challenging to keep up with the soaring demand for assistance. These constraints need to be understood better if the gap between expectations and capability is to be closed. Second, there is a need to complement institutional capacity-development with an enhanced focus on improving service delivery, namely security and public safety, to end-users. This requires supporting people-centred approaches to security sector reform and recognizing that partnerships should be forged not only with regional organizations and Governments but also with civil society organizations and other non-State actors. Partnerships within the United Nations system are also crucial to leverage political capacities on the issue. Doing so means reflecting on how to engage more systematically with the special representatives and deputy-special representatives of the Secretary-General in the field and with the Peacebuilding Commission, among others. Third, efforts should be made to go beyond a focus on security sector components such as police, military, customs, immigration, civil emergency and other related functions. The United Nations and its partners should enhance the assistance they provide at the sector-wide level by, for example, providing support to national security policy and legislative frameworks, national dialogues for a common security vision, democratic and civilian oversight, civil society and other initiatives that define the strategic, security sector budgeting and financial management, governance and oversight framework for reform, and the roles, responsibilities and powers of security institutions. Initiatives at the sector-wide level aim to produce systemic improvements within the security sector by transforming the strategic, architectural and foundational basis common to all security sector components. There is also a need to reflect on how to better promote linkages to other policy areas and initiatives, such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, the rule of law, and armed violence and development. Finally, in terms of understanding the value of the United Nations support to security sector reform, there is a need to strongly engage in monitoring and evaluation and, in particular, to reflect on how to meaningfully measure impact.

New trends in security sector reform

14. In the seminar a number of examples of new trends that are relevant for security sector reform and United Nations engagement in this area were identified. These include: the dramatically evolving nature of conflict, which requires new approaches that go beyond purely military or diplomatic approaches; the recognition that violence is one of the biggest obstacles to human development and that addressing violence requires enhanced linkages between security sector reform and development; and the existence of new policy initiatives, such as the international dialogue on peacebuilding and State-building initiative of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which, among other things, is developing indicators that will support the measurement of progress in important areas of security sector reform.

15. In terms of how the United Nations should position itself to adapt to these trends, numerous approaches were discussed. First, there is a need to recognize and

act on linkages between security sector reform and development, peacebuilding and political transitions. This includes placing security sector reform within a larger strategic framework and supporting national dialogues on such reform. Second, security sector reform should be supported as part of a society-wide rather than a State-centric approach. This presupposes an additional emphasis on local solutions. Third, further support should be provided for South-South cooperation on security sector reform. There needs to be a more direct exchange of experiences among countries that have already undergone reform processes. Such an exchange should include the sharing of both knowledge and technical capacities. Fourth, further emphasis is required on the governance, oversight and management dimensions of security sector reform, with a focus on promoting transparency, responsibility and participation to ensure the effective and accountable delivery of safety and security.

Recommendations

16. The series of events provided a valuable platform for discussing the United Nations approach to security sector reform. The high-level meeting of the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform and the expert-level seminar resulted in a concrete body of recommendations that were welcomed by United Nations representatives as important contributions for the second report of the Secretary-General on how best to strengthen the comprehensive United Nations approach to security sector reform, which was requested by the Security Council in its presidential statement of 12 October 2011 (S/PRST/2011/19).

Normative level

17. Some of the key recommendations relating to the normative level follow:

(a) There are many contexts other than post-conflict situations where security sector reform is relevant. The United Nations approach to such reform should take into account the need to engage with and learn from experiences gained in broad peacebuilding, development and democratization contexts. The second report of the Secretary-General should take into account these different contexts and assess the support that the United Nations has provided to determine if and how its approach to security sector reform should be adapted to provide effective support in these different contexts;

(b) There is a need to go back to the foundations of security sector reform. A number of security sector reform principles were highlighted in the first report of the Secretary-General and have been emphasized at the various regional workshops that Member States have supported. However, a number of the principles have remained difficult to put into practice. These include, in particular, the principles on national ownership, security sector reform strategies and frameworks, and national and international coordination. In the second report of the Secretary-General, the practicality and validity of the principles contained in the first report should be assessed against the current context. Principles of national ownership, democratic governance of the security sector and national and international coordination should be highlighted as core principles that need to be addressed across the United Nations system. Significant work has been done to incorporate these principles into the Integrated Technical Guidance Notes on Security Sector Reform. Emphasis should be placed on recording and reviewing progress made in the implementation of the Guidance Notes and on compiling best practices;

(c) There is a need to reflect more on a people-centred approach to security sector reform that is based on the improvement of service delivery in the areas of security and public safety to the population. The United Nations should continue to look for ways and means of improving its effectiveness on the ground and assisting Member States in addressing the whole of society.

Operational level

18. Some of the key recommendations relating to the operational level follow:

(a) United Nations support for security sector reform is limited in terms of both human and financial resources. These constraints need to be understood better if the gap between expectations and capability is to be closed. Security sector reform processes require multi-year funding programmes to enhance flexibility in the provision of support as well as long-term planning, which can lead to strengthened sustainability of support. The second report of the Secretary-General should assess how United Nations system-wide human and financial resources in the field and at Headquarters have contributed to the achievement of security sector reform objectives. Based on this assessment and keeping in mind value-for-money principles, consideration should be given in the report to the capacities needed to match support requirements. Such capacities could include enhancing the role and strengthening the inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force and its members in terms of their ability to provide backstopping support to the field and to fulfil their system-wide roles;

(b) While the inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force has demonstrated the value of its coordination role during the development of the Integrated Technical Guidance Notes, further effort should be made to build on this. This includes the need to reflect on the interoperability of Task Force members. The second report of the Secretary-General should include ways to leverage political capacities and build on existing United Nations strengths and comparative advantages;

(c) Partnerships have been a key element of the United Nations approach to security sector reform, and further attention should be given to enhancing them, especially with Governments and regional and subregional organizations. There is also a need to include national and international non-State actors involved in security sector reform in these interactions, dialogue and frameworks of cooperation. In addition, partnerships should be forged while focusing more on providing support to South-South cooperation;

(d) Greater attention needs to be paid to monitoring and evaluating United Nations support efforts in the area of security sector reform. This is required in order to understand better the impact that the Organization's support has on such reform, with the ultimate objective of further enhancing the support provided.

The way forward

19. During the events, a number of follow-up measures were identified, including:

(a) Submission of the Chair's statement on the events to the Secretary-General, the President of the Security Council and the President of the General Assembly for circulation to Member States and to United Nations agencies and

departments in order to provide fi ther impetus to the continuing dialogue on United Nations support to security sector reform;

(b) Holding of the next meeting of the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform, at the working level, in the first quarter of 2013, with special emphasis on continuing the important dialogue on the second report of the Secretary-General on security sector reform;

(c) Dissemination of the core messages contained in the Integrated Technical Guidance Notes to a wide audience. Slovakia will examine, with the co-Chairs of the inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force and with the support of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, the possibility of organizing other launch or roll-out events in other regions of the world.

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Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Letter dated 8 February 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with instructions received from the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan, I have the honour to draw your attention to ongoing violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia recorded for January 2013 (see annex). As can be seen from the annexed information, during the reporting period, the armed forces of Armenia continued intensive fire from their positions in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan and from the territory of Armenia.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 34 and 39, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Agshin **Mehdiyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 8 February 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia* for January 2013

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
1	1 January	0005-0020	Berdavan village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Kemerli village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
2		0010-0020	Barekamavan village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Gaymagly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
3		0020-0030	Berdavan village, (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Kemerli village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	PK machine gun	–
4		0210-0225	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
5		0215-0225	Javahirli and Ahmadaghaly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
6		0500-0510	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
7		0500-0515		AKM assault rifle	–
8		0510-0515		AKM assault rifle	–
9		0540-0545		AKM assault rifle	–
10		0725-0730		AK-type assault rifle	–
11		1300-1325	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
12		2005-2020	Garagashly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
13		2040-2045	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
14		2245-2300	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
15		2250-2300			–
16	2 January	0005-0015	Garagashly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
17		1820-1825	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
18		1825-1827	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
19		2220-2235	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–

* Settlements of the Republic of Azerbaijan listed in this annex are under occupation by the Republic of Armenia or situated close to the fire-point areas.

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
20	3 January	0020-0025	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
21		0245-0300	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
22		0330-0345	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
23		1020-1030		AK-type assault rifle	–
24		1650-1700	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
25		1815-1840	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
26		2050-2055	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
27		2315-2325	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
28	4 January	0202-0205	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
29		0210-0215			–
30		0545-0555			–
31	5 January	0040-0050	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
32		0550-0555	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
33		2240-2245	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
34	6 January	1440-1500	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
35		1816-1825	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
36		2230-2245	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
37	7 January	0005-0030	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
38		0330-0335	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
39	8 January	0105-0115	Saryjaly and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
40		0205-0215	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
41		0245-0300	Voskepar village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Ashaghy Eskipara village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
42		1200-1230	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
43		1245-1250	Shuraabad and Tezekend villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
44	9 January	0145-0150	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
45		0340-0350	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	
46		0350-0405	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
47		1015-1020	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	PK machine gun	–
48	10 January	0040-0045	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
49		0040-0050	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
50		0140-0145	Shuraabad and Tezekend villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
51		1555-1615	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
52		1850-1905	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
53	11 January	0005-0015	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
54		0050-0110	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
55		2330-2335	Shirvanly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
56		0225-0230	Shuraabad and Tezekend villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
57		0225-0230	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
58	12 January	0335-0340	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
59		0820-0830	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
60		1630-1645	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
61		1725-1730	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
62		2010-2015	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
63		2255-2310			–
64		2355-2358			–
65	13 January	0005-0010	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
66		1725-1730	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
67		2030-2035	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
68		2140-2155	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
69		2150-2200	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
70		2330-2345	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
71		2350-2355	Javahirli and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	PK machine gun	–
72	14 January	0025-0040	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
73		0345-0350	Javahirli and Chiragly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
74		0800-0815	Chinari village (Berd district, Armenia) and Kokhanabi village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	PK machine gun	–
75		1620-1640	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
76		1815-1819	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
77		1825-1827	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
78		2115-2130	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
79		2245-2250	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
80		2250-2255	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
81	15 January	0150-0200	Shuraabad and Tezekend villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
82		1830-1850	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
83		1905-1925	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type and AKM assault rifles	–
84		1850-1940			–
85	16 January	0105-0115	Javahirli and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
86		0140-0145	Garagashly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
87		0830-0835	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
88		1555-1600	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
89		1700-1720	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
90		1720-1725	Javahirli and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
91		2140-2150	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
92		2210-2220	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
93	17 January	0005-0020	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
94		0110-0115	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	PK machine gun	–
95		0225-0230	Garagashly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
96		1630-1640	Talysh and Tapgaraqoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
97		2030-2035	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
98	18 January	0250-0305	Javahirli and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
99		1140-1150	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
100		1155-1200	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
101		1655-1700	Saryjaly and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
102		2320-2325	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
103	19 January	0050-0100	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	PK machine gun	–
104		0310-0315	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
105		1355-1420	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
106		1415-1420	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
107		1435-1440	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	–
108		1440-1505	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
109		1630-1645	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
110		2325-2330	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
111		2345-2350	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
112	20 January	0140-0150	Shirvanly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
113		0140-0150	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type and AKM assault rifles	–
114		0145-0150	Saryjaly and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
115		0155-0200			–
116		0245-0250	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
117		0300-0305			–
118		0350-0355	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
119		0555-0600	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
120		1620-1625	Saryjaly and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
121		1725-1730	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
122		2005-2015	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
123		2045-2055	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
124		2050-2105	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
125		2050-2105	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
126		2245-2255	Berdavan village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Kemerli village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
127		2330-2335	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
128	21 January	0450-0500	Garagashly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
129		1950-2015	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
130		2040-2045	Mehdili and Jojug Marjanly villages (Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	–
131	22 January	0010-0015	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
132		0240-0245	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	PK machine gun	–
133		0550-0555	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
134		1620-1628	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
135		2140-2155	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
136	23 January	0255-0257	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
137		0620-0622	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
138		0630-0637			–
139		1330-1340	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
140		1755-1805	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
141		1900-1905	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–
142		2005-2025	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
143	24 January	0050-0055	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
144		0720-0730	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
145		1525-1530	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
146		1655-1700			–
147		1845-1905	Mosesgekh village (Berd district, Armenia) and Alibeyli village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	–
148		2115-2120	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
149	25 January	0030-0040	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
150		0540-0545	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
151		0630-0636	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
152		0630-0636	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
153		0700-0705	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
154		1355-1410	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
155		1400-1420			–
156		2130-2135	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
157		2300-2320	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
158		2340-2350	Javahirli and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
159	26 January	0035-0040	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
160		0445-0450	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
161		1030-1055	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
162		1645-1655	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
163		2205-2210	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
164		2250-2255	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
165		2310-2320	Shirvanly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
166	27 January	0025-0030	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
167		0205-0240	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
168		0405-0410	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
169		1750-1755	Chinari village (Berd district, Armenia) and Kokhanabi village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
170	28 January	0035-0045	Garagashly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
171		0135-0140	Javahirli and Ahmadaghaly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
172		0430-0500	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
173		1635-1640	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
174	29 January	0520-0530	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
175		1735-1740	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
176	30 January	0145-0155	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
177		0240-0250	Garagashly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
178		0400-0405	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
179		0735-0740	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
180		1410-1420	Orjenekidze village (Krasnoselsk district, Armenia) and Mutudere village (Gedabey district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
181		1525-1530	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
182		2120-2125	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
183		2215-2220	Garagashly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
184		2220-2225	Shirvanly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
185	31 January	0130-0135	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type and AKM assault rifles	–
186		0200-0205			–
187		0335-0340	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
188		0550-0555	Saryjaly and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
189		1810-1820	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
190		2110-2120	Shirvanly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
191		2115-2125	Garagashly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
192		2147-2150	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
193		2210-2220	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–



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Security Council

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Argentina, France, Republic of Korea, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions and the statements of its President on Burundi,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Burundi,

Welcoming the continued progress that Burundi has made towards peace, stability and development and *emphasizing* the need for the United Nations system and the international community, including the international financial institutions and Burundi's development partners, to maintain their support for peace consolidation and long-term development in Burundi, and, in that connection, *commending* the Government of Burundi on the finalization of the new Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, second generation (PRSP-II), and on the agreement with the United Nations on a new United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), and *commending also* the efforts of the Burundi Government to raise revenue through the Office of Burundi Revenue and reaffirming its support for the work of this institution,

Further welcoming the success of the Conference of Burundi's Development Partners held on 29-30 October 2012 in Geneva, which marks the commitment of international partners to support the efforts of Burundi to implement the PRSP-II and the commitment of the Government of Burundi to pursue structural reforms aimed at improving political, economic and administrative governance, in line with its National strategy on good governance and fight against corruption,

Commending the continued contribution of the United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB) and the United Nations system to the country's peace, security and development,

Encouraging further efforts from the Government of Burundi to ensure a space for all political parties, including from the extra-parliamentary opposition, and to continue improving dialogue between all relevant actors, including civil society,

Taking note of the appointment of the new Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) and urging CENI to work closely with all political actors for the preparation of the 2015 elections, in a spirit of continuous dialogue and search for consensus,

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Welcoming the intention of BNUB and the United Nations system to organize, in 2013, an initiative, with broad participation, on lessons learned from the 2010 electoral process to inform the preparation of the 2015 elections,

Noting the efforts made by the Government of Burundi to improve the human rights situation in Burundi, and *remaining concerned* by continued human rights violations, in particular ongoing extrajudicial killings including politically motivated killings, mistreatment of detainees and torture, and restrictions on civil liberties, notably harassment, intimidation, including by youth groups, limitations on the freedom of press, of expression, of association and of assembly of opposition political parties, media and civil society organizations,

Noting with continued concern the continued attacks against civilians as well as security and defence forces in various parts of the country and the reports of paramilitary activities in neighbouring countries and *demanding that* all those involved to put an end to such acts,

Underscoring the importance of transitional justice mechanisms in promoting lasting reconciliation among all the people of Burundi, *taking note* of the draft law on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission developed by the Government of Burundi and passed to Parliament on 12 December 2012, and *recalling* in this context the commitment of the Government of Burundi to establishing transitional justice mechanisms consistent with the results of the 2009 national consultations, Security Council resolution 1606 (2005) as well as the Arusha agreement of 28 August 2000,

Recalling that Burundi is a State Party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court since 2004, and has undertaken obligations to fight impunity for crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the Court, and emphasizing that the International Criminal Court is complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions,

Supporting the renewed commitment of Burundi to "zero tolerance" for corruption,

Welcoming the continued engagement of the Peacebuilding Commission in Burundi, including the contribution of the Burundi Configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission, and *welcoming* the readiness of the Peacebuilding Fund to provide an additional tranche of support to peacebuilding efforts in Burundi,

Supporting the continued commitment of Burundi to regional integration and cooperation with neighbours, notably through the Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL), the East African Community (EAC), and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR),

Recalling its resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009) and 1960 (2010) on women and peace and security, its resolutions 1674 (2006) and 1894 (2009) on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts and its resolutions 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009), 1998 (2011) and 2068 (2012) on children and armed conflict,

Having considered the latest report of the Secretary-General on BNUB (S/2013/36) and, in particular, the analysis it contains of progress and remaining challenges in relation to the benchmarks transmitted to the Security Council by the Secretary-General pursuant to resolutions 1959 (2010) and 2027 (2011), which are

intended to inform the future transition from BNUB to regular engagement by a United Nations country team,

1. *Decides* to extend until 15 February 2014 the mandate of BNUB, requesting it, consistent with paragraphs 3 (a) to (d) of the resolution 1959 (2010) and 2 (a) and (b) of the resolution 2027 (2011), to focus on and support the Government of Burundi in the following areas:

(a) Promoting and facilitating dialogue between national actors and supporting mechanisms for broad-based participation in political life, including for the implementation of development strategies and programmes in Burundi and towards ensuring a conducive, free and open environment for the run up to the 2015 elections;

(b) Strengthening the independence, capacities and legal frameworks of key national institutions, in particular judicial and parliamentary institutions, in line with international standards and principles;

(c) Supporting efforts to fight impunity, particularly through the establishment of transparent, independent and impartial transitional justice mechanisms to strengthen national unity, promote justice and promote reconciliation within Burundi's society, and providing operational support to the functioning of these bodies;

(d) Promoting and protecting human rights, including strengthening national capacities in that area, as well as national civil society;

(e) Supporting the efforts of the Government and the international community to focus on the socioeconomic development of women and youth and the socioeconomic reintegration of conflict-affected populations, including recently repatriated refugees and internally displaced persons, and advocating for resource mobilization for Burundi, with a view to consolidating peace, improving governance and relaunching sustainable development in the framework of the PRSP-II;

(f) Providing support to Burundi's deepening regional integration, as requested;

2. *Recognizes* the primary responsibility of the Government of Burundi for peacebuilding, security, protection of its population and long-term development in the country, and *encourages* the Government of Burundi to continue its efforts regarding peace consolidation challenges, in particular democratic governance, the fight against corruption, security sector reform, civilian protection, justice and the promotion and protection of human rights, with a special focus on the rights of women and children as well as marginalized and vulnerable minorities;

3. *Encourages* the Government of Burundi with the support of BNUB and other international partners to redouble its efforts to pursue structural reforms aimed at improving political, economic and administrative governance and tackling corruption, with a view to setting up strong drivers for sustained and equitable social and economic growth;

4. *Calls upon* the Government of Burundi to foster inclusive elections in 2015 by continuing to improve dialogue between all national actors, including civil society, and to guarantee a space for all political parties, including from the extra-

parliamentary opposition, to exercise their freedom to organize and prepare themselves for the 2015 elections;

5. *Calls upon* the Government of Burundi to pursue its efforts to ensure the promotion and protection of human rights and, together with its international partners, to support and strengthen the capacities of the National Independent Human Rights Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman in accordance with General Assembly resolution A/RES/48/134 on national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights, and further *encourages* the Government to continue its fight against impunity and to take the necessary measures to ensure the full enjoyment of civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights as enshrined in the Constitution of Burundi and in accordance with its obligations under international law;

6. *Calls upon* the Government of Burundi to take further necessary steps to prevent human rights violations, in particular ongoing extrajudicial killings including politically motivated killings, mistreatment of detainees and torture, and restrictions on civil liberties, notably harassment, intimidation, including by youth groups, limitations on the freedom of press, of expression, of association and of assembly of opposition political parties, media and civil society organizations, and to ensure that such human rights violations and restrictions of civil liberties are put to an end;

7. *Calls upon* the Government of Burundi to take measures to fight impunity and support thorough, credible, impartial and transparent investigations, including by reinforcing the protection of victims, of their relatives and of witnesses, and to intensify efforts to ensure that those responsible for human rights violations and restrictions on civil liberties are swiftly arrested and brought to justice;

8. *Calls upon* the Government of Burundi to work with international partners and BNUB for the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms, including a credible and consensual Truth and Reconciliation Commission to help foster an effective reconciliation of all Burundians and durable peace in Burundi, in accordance with the results of the work of the Technical Committee, the 2009 national consultations, Security Council resolution 1606 (2005) as well as the Arusha agreement of 28 August 2000;

9. *Encourages* the Government of Burundi to pursue its efforts of peace consolidation and reconstruction in a regional perspective, especially through projects fostering peace, reconciliation and exchanges within the East African Community, the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region;

10. *Further encourages* the Government of Burundi, with the support of international partners as appropriate, to ensure the voluntary, safe and orderly return and sustainable reintegration of refugees to Burundi;

11. *Underscores* the importance of security sector reform and *urges* all international partners, together with BNUB, to continue supporting Burundi's efforts to professionalize and enhance the capacity of the national security services and the police, in particular through vetting for human rights violations, training on human rights and sexual and gender-based violence and promoting strong civilian oversight and monitoring, with the view to consolidating security sector governance;

12. *Calls on* the Government of Burundi, with the support of the Peacebuilding Commission and international partners, to honour its commitments on peacebuilding priorities as defined in the new Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP-II), and *underscores the importance* that international partners, in collaboration with the Government of Burundi, and with the support of BNUB, the United Nations system in Burundi and the Peacebuilding Commission, continue to support Burundi's development efforts and ensure effective follow-up of commitments taken at the Geneva Conference of Development Partners to allow implementation of the PRSP-II and support the implementation of the new United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF);

13. *Takes note* of the progress on the implementation of the BNUB mandate and in Burundi's peace consolidation, as assessed against the benchmarks for the future evolution of BNUB into a United Nations Country Team presence and as reported by the Secretary-General, and *requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed on the benchmarks, the implementation of the mandate of BNUB and this resolution, and the conditions that affect such implementation, and to provide a briefing by the end of July 2013 and a report by 17 January 2014, reflecting particularly the outcomes of the Strategic Assessment Mission (SAM) the Secretary-General has indicated his intention to deploy in the course of 2013;

14. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

United Nations S/2013/88

Security Council

Distr.: General
12 February 2013

Original: English

Letter dated 12 February 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to write to you with regard to the baseless allegations concerning the seizure of a ship containing armaments originating from the Islamic Republic of Iran destined for Yemen. In this regard I would like to draw your attention to the following:

1. Preliminary investigations indicate that the ship seized in Yemen does not belong to the Islamic Republic of Iran. The ship is registered in Spain and navigating under the flag of Panama.

2. According to the Yemeni officials, eight individuals among the ship's crew are citizens of Yemen and there is no Iranian citizen among the arrested people.

3. If there is a claim that the ship was loaded and embarked from an Iranian port, it is necessary that the information regarding the GPS of the navigation route be delivered to Iran for further investigations. It should be noted that even some Yemeni officials have suggested the probability that the ship might not have embarked from Iran.

4. It has been further claimed that the items seized on board the ship were produced in Iran. Even if some of these items were made in Iran, this does not provide any evidence that Iran was involved in the shipment of arms to Yemen.

5. Unfortunately, this is not the first time that some Yemeni officials have levelled allegations of arms transfer against the Islamic Republic of Iran. During the Presidency of ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh, similar unfounded allegations were made against the Islamic Republic of Iran, and later they were refuted by the Yemeni Government officials.

6. As is the practice, if there is any evidence regarding the illegal transfer of arms to Yemen, such evidence should be provided to the Iranian officials for investigations. Obviously accusations could not be based on the confessions of some arrested Yemeni citizens.

In this regard, I wish to bring to your attention that the allegations, whether about the ship's ownership or arms shipment from Iran to Yemen, are absurd fabrications and have no basis or validity. They are, therefore, categorically rejected by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

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It is my Government's expectation that the Security Council and its relevant sanctions Committee will address this prima facie politically motivated move. My Government is prepared to fully cooperate and investigate the case by providing necessary information and evidence.

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammad **Khazaee**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



United Nations A/ES-10/581–S/2013/89

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
13 February 2013

Original: English

General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Sixty-eighth year

Identical letters dated 12 February 2013 from the Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I regret to once again have to draw your attention to the critical and tense situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem — the territory that constitutes the State of Palestine — as a result of Israel's relentless provocations and illegal actions against the Palestinian people. The systematic human rights violations and breaches of humanitarian law, particularly the theft and colonization of the Palestinian land and the displacement of the Palestinian civilian population, which are being perpetrated by the occupying Power, are undermining the fragile situation on the ground and undermining the hopes for renewed peace efforts.

In follow-up to my previous letters, I must once again convey our grave concern regarding the plight of Palestinian prisoners and detainees being held captive by Israel, the occupying Power, particularly the plight of several prisoners who are on long-term hunger strikes in protest of their unlawful detention. I have raised this serious matter directly in my recent letters dated 24 January 2013 (A/ES-10/579-S/2013/52) and 8 February 2013 (A/ES-10/580-S/2013/84), and President Mahmoud Abbas has emphasized the gravity of this issue in a letter to you dated today, 12 February 2013. We appeal to the United Nations to exert the necessary efforts and to use the good offices of this organization to compel the occupying Power to act humanely towards the hunger striking prisoners and to release them and all other Palestinians being unlawfully and arbitrarily detained.

In this regard, we once again draw the attention of the international community to the critical conditions of the following prisoners, whose lives are in imminent danger owing to the hunger strikes they have undertaken in peaceful, non-violent protest of their captivity and to the callous disregard of the occupying Power of their rights and their lives: Samer Issawi, who has been on hunger strike for 204 days and faces death if there is no intervention to save his life; Ayman Sharawna, who has been on hunger strike for 140 days; Tareq Qedan, who has also been on hunger

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strike for 78 days; and Jafar Ezzedine, who has also been on hunger strike for 78 days. We appeal for action to save the lives of these men and to compel Israel to cease its practice of arbitrary detention and imprisonment of Palestinian civilians, including children, and its egregious physical and psychological mistreatment of the thousands of Palestinians in its captivity.

I am also compelled to draw your attention once again to Israel's illegal settlement activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. The occupying Power continues its land grab and its efforts to clear the Palestinian land of its indigenous inhabitants as it continues to feverishly pursue this illegal expansionist agenda. On Sunday, 10 February, the Israeli Government granted approval for the construction of 90 more units in the illegal settlement of "Beit El", adjacent to the Palestinian cities of Ramallah and Al-Bireh, setting the way for construction to begin as early as tomorrow. It is to be recalled that the plans for these units are part of the "deal" of the Prime Minister of Israel for the evacuation of the "Ulpana" settlement, which was also constructed illegally on confiscated Palestinian land deep in the West Bank. Thus, the Government of Israel continues to demonstrate its total rejection of international law, particularly the fourth Geneva Convention, its lack of commitment to the two-State solution on the basis of the pre-1967 borders and, in fact, its intention to destroy that solution.

The recent period has also witnessed aggressive and destructive actions by the occupying Power in the al-Khalil (Hebron) area, both in the city of al-Khalil and the surrounding southern hills. On 9 February, Palestinian activists, supported by several international activists, set up another protest village, "Kanaan Village", in the southern hill area of al-Khalil, near the village of al-Tuwani, in peaceful protest against Israel's illegal plans and ongoing attempts to demolish homes and infrastructure in the area and to forcibly remove the Palestinian inhabitants. In this regard, Israel has declared the area a so-called "closed military zone", and yet is allowing Israeli settlers to remain there, and is pushing forward with plans to destroy eight Palestinian villages to make way for the establishment of an army training ground. Regrettably, the Israeli occupying forces descended with force upon the Kanaan Village demonstrators, beating them, destroying the tents that had been set up in protest and detaining several of the protesters and three journalists.

Also in this regard, on 9 February, the Israeli occupying army forcibly prevented 150 farmers from reaching their land in Susiya in the southern hill area, further imperilling their livelihoods and violating their rights. It is important to recall here that the Palestinian residents of the area are currently, with the support, among others, of Rabbis for Human Rights, petitioning the Israeli court against the demolition of their homes and gaining access to their farmlands, which are near an Israeli settlement that was illegally constructed there on confiscated Palestinian land.

This was followed on Sunday, 10 February, by the vandalization of a Palestinian community centre in the heart of al-Khalil by a group of extremist Israeli settlers. The settlers uprooted trees and caused damage to the centre as part of an ongoing campaign of intimidation and terror being perpetrated daily by the approximately 800 settlers illegally transferred to the city against the more than 180,000 Palestinian civilians there.

Also in the al-Khalil area, the Israeli occupying forces carried out more demolitions on 11 February. Several structures, including a home, shed and water

well, were destroyed in Beit Awwa village, leaving eight members of a Palestinian family homeless. Civilian protests against the demolition were met by force by the occupying army, causing injury to several people. On the same day, the Israeli occupying forces demolished a residential trailer in the town of Idhna, displacing eight members of another Palestinian family, and also razed parts of the surrounding land on which the family raises produce for their livelihood.

All of these Israeli policies and measures constitute grave contraventions of international law, including humanitarian and human rights law, with some amounting to war crimes. The international community cannot continue absolving Israel, the occupying Power, of its responsibility for these violations and of its obligations to respect international law. Efforts must be exerted, including by the United Nations Security Council, to bring a halt to these violations, to stem the deterioration of the situation on the ground and to preserve and seize forthwith the dwindling opportunity that remains to achieve the two-State solution for peace.

This letter is in follow-up to our previous 453 letters regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, which constitutes the territory of the State of Palestine. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 8 February 2013 (A/ES-10/580-S/2013/84), constitute a basic record of the crimes being committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of these war crimes, acts of State terrorism and systematic human rights violations being committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Riyad **Mansour**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations

United Nations S/2013/90

Security Council

Distr.: General
12 February 2013

Original: English

Letter dated 11 February 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

Pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1575 (2004), 1639 (2005), 1722 (2006), 1785 (2007), 1845 (2008), 1895 (2009), 1948 (2010), 2019 (2011) and 2074 (2012), I have the honour to convey a letter dated 29 January 2013 from the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, transmitting the thirty-second report on the activities of the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (see annex). The report covers the period from 1 September to 30 November 2012.

I should be grateful if you would bring this letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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Annex

Letter dated 29 January 2013 from the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with Security Council resolutions 1575 (2004), 1639 (2005), 1722 (2006), 1785 (2007), 1845 (2008), 1895 (2009), 1948 (2010), 2019 (2011) and 2074 (2012), please find enclosed the thirty-second three-monthly report on Operation Althea to the Security Council (see enclosure).

(*Signed*) Catherine **Ashton**

Enclosure

Report of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the activities of the European Union military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina

I. Introduction

1. The present report covers the period from 1 September to 30 November 2012.

2. In its resolutions 1575 (2004), 1639 (2005), 1722 (2006), 1785 (2007), 1845 (2008), 1895 (2009), 1948 (2010), 2019 (2011) and 2074 (2012), the Security Council requested that Member States, acting through or in cooperation with the European Union, report to the Council on the activities of the European Union military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) at least at three-month intervals. This is the thirty-second such report.

II. Political background

3. The reporting period was largely marked by political instability and a lack of substantial progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina. While European integration remained a political priority for the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the political leaders were preoccupied with the local elections held on 7 October and with efforts to reshuffle government coalitions at both the state level and in the Federation. As a result, in its progress report, the European Commission warned that Bosnia and Herzegovina was lagging behind the region in terms of making progress on the path to European integration.

4. Although the positive momentum established during the previous reporting period has not been sustained, the next steps required for making progress on the European Union path remain unchanged. These are, notably, the implementation of the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in the *Sejdic Finci* case and the setting up of the Bosnia and Herzegovina coordination mechanism for European Union affairs. The political parties of Bosnia and Herzegovina have submitted for parliamentary consideration various proposals on how to implement the ruling of the Court but have so far failed to reach a compromise that would meet the requirements of the European Union and other relevant European institutions. This is essential for the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union to enter into force.

5. Some progress has been made on the implementation of the State Aid Law and the Population and Household Census Law. The State Aid Council has been formally established, but further steps need to be taken to ensure it is fully functional. The pilot census, held in October, provided valuable input for the preparation of the countrywide census, to be held in 2013.

6. On 7 October 2012, municipal elections were conducted in a generally fair and peaceful manner; no serious incidents were reported. There were some delays in certifying the election results. Notably, in Srebrenica the electoral results were challenged, thus delaying the formation of the local institutions.

7. In Brcko district there were hopeful signs of reconciliation following the suspension of international supervision, and the mayor and the government of Brcko were appointed speedily after the local elections. In Mostar, the Office of the High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement continued to carry out his facilitation functions following the absence of local elections in the city. However, owing to the intransigence of the political parties, there has been little progress in this regard.

8. Following the local elections, the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats and the Social Democratic Party concluded an agreement that led to the establishment of a new six-party coalition at the state level. The new Council of Ministers was formed in November. However, the political instability resulting from the ongoing government reshuffle in the Federation continues to distract the political leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina from working effectively to address the country's challenges, including the implementation of the European Union-related agenda.

9. Progress on the registration of state and defence property remained limited. Despite reiteration of the commitment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to Bosnia and Herzegovina, no progress has been registered in fulfilling the outstanding condition for the activation of the NATO Membership Action Plan.

10. The economy continued its negative trend. The forecast for 2013 has been revised to zero or negative growth. Full implementation of the latest arrangement of the International Monetary Fund for Bosnia and Herzegovina is essential. Bosnia and Herzegovina is also late in addressing the challenges deriving from the accession of Croatia to the European Union.

11. The comprehensive approach promoted by a reinforced European Union presence on the ground (resulting from the merging of the European Union delegation and the Office of the European Union special representative) and the continued close cooperation between the special representative and Operation Althea further consolidated and strengthened the European Union's engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

III. Security situation and activities of the European Union military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina

12. The overall security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina remained calm and stable throughout the reporting period. Inflammatory nationalistic rhetoric continued, but it had no impact on the maintenance of a safe and secure environment. The rhetoric ahead of the municipal elections contributed to increased political tension. The number of inter-ethnic incidents so far in 2012 was lower compared with the same period in 2011 and almost at the same level as during 2010. Organized crime was characterized by a large number of small groupings, with no consolidated and permanent links among them. The number of crimes committed against property grew, as did the use of firearms in different sorts of crime. Football-related hooliganism with ethnic undertones remained an issue of concern countrywide. The current economic situation (rising food and energy prices), the high rate of unemployment and the weak administrative structures remained matters of concern.

13. Corruption continued to be a concern and was in general not successfully prosecuted.

14. Law enforcement agencies continued to prove capable of dealing with threats to the maintenance of a safe and secure environment and EUFOR was not called upon to intervene.

15. As at 1 September 2012, the force has been reconfigured in line with Council conclusions. The main effort is on building capacity and training while retaining the means to contribute to the deterrence capacity of the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The force was concentrated in Sarajevo, and liaison and observation teams were deployed throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Twenty-three nations (18 European Union, 5 non-European Union) provided troops.

16. A new intermediate reserve concept has been developed to allow the European Union to deploy a minimum of four companies within four days independently, without having to bid for the shared European Union/NATO operational reserve. These companies are based outside the country and, once called to the operation, will operate under the multinational battalion command and control within the overall EUFOR structure.

17. The capability of the shared European Union/NATO over-the-horizon reserve forces was limited because the forces were partially deployed to Kosovo and because on 15 November 2012 the German-Austrian battalion withdrew its support to EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

18. EUFOR continued to advise and monitor the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the context of activities related to ammunition and weapons storage sites, the civilian and military movement of weapons and military equipment, the disposal of surplus weapons and ammunition and defence industry factories.

19. On 14 November 2012, the Security Council adopted resolution 2074 (2012), by which it extended the executive mandate of EUFOR for another year.

IV. Outlook

20. The security situation is expected to remain calm and stable.

United Nations S/2013/91

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 February 2013

Original: English

Note verbale dated 13 February 2013 from the Permanent Mission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Permanent Mission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Office of the President of the Security Council and has the honour to transmit herewith the statement of the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) dated 12 February 2013 with regard to the nuclear test of the DPRK (see annex).

The Permanent Mission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations would appreciate it if the present note verbale and the attached statement were circulated immediately as a document of the Security Council.

13-23375 (E) 190213

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Annex to the note verbale dated 13 February 2013 from the Permanent Mission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Pyongyang, 12 February 2013

The DPRK's third nuclear test is a resolute step for self-defence taken by it to cope with the hostile act of the United States of America against it.

Its successful launch of satellite Kwangmyongsong 3-2 in December 2012 was a peaceful one from A to Z and was conducted according to its plan for scientific and technological development for economic construction and the improvement of people's standard of living.

The world, including hostile countries, recognized its application satellite's entry into orbit and greatly admired its development of space technology.

The U.S., however, again prodded the Security Council into cooking up a new "resolution on sanctions" against the DPRK, terming its satellite launch a violation of the Council's "resolution".

Encroaching upon the right to launch a satellite is an unpardonable, grave and hostile act, as it is an infringement on the DPRK's sovereignty.

Originally, the DPRK neither needed nor planned to conduct a nuclear test.

The DPRK's nuclear deterrence has already acquired trustworthy capability and enough strength to make a precision strike at bases of aggression and blow them up with a single blow, no matter where they are on the Earth.

It was the DPRK's goal to focus its efforts on economic construction and the improvement of people's standard of living by dint of nuclear deterrence for self-defence provided by the great Generalissimos Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il all their lives.

The DPRK exercised maximum self-restraint when the U.S. fabricated the "presidential statement" over its satellite, launched for peaceful purposes, abusing the Security Council in April 2012.

But the DPRK's patience reached its limit when the U.S. intensified such hostile acts by implementing, before anyone else, the Security Council's "resolution on sanctions", far from apologizing for its renewed wanton violation of the DPRK's right to launch a satellite.

The main objective of the current nuclear test is to express the surging resentment of the army and people of the DPRK at the brigandish, hostile act of the U.S. and to demonstrate the will and capability of Songun Korea to defend the sovereignty of the country to the end.

The DPRK's nuclear test is a just step for self-defence and is not contradictory to any international law.

United Nations S/2013/92

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 February 2013

Original: English

Australia, France, Luxembourg, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and statements of its President concerning Sudan,

Reaffirming its commitment to the cause of peace throughout Sudan, to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Sudan, to the full and timely implementation of resolution 1591 (2005) and *recalling* the importance of the principles of good neighbourliness, non-interference and cooperation in the relations among States in the region,

Recognizing that the Darfur conflict cannot be resolved militarily and a durable solution can only be obtained through an inclusive political process,

Reiterating its full support for efforts to reach a comprehensive and inclusive solution to the conflict in Darfur, welcoming the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur as a basis for these efforts, and reiterating the need for the completion of the political process, and an end to the violence and abuses in Darfur,

Urging the Government of Sudan and the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) to deliver on the commitments made in the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, and *urging* all parties, in particular other armed movements who have not signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, to engage immediately and without preconditions and to make every effort to reach a comprehensive peace settlement on the basis of the DDPD, and to agree upon a permanent ceasefire without further delay,

Expressing concern about the political and military links between non-signatory armed groups in Darfur and groups outside Darfur, and demanding that any form of direct or indirect external support for such groups ceases, and *condemning* any actions by any armed group aimed at forced overthrow of the Government of Sudan,

Demanding that the parties to the conflict exercise restraint and cease military action of all kind, including aerial bombardments,

Demanding an immediate and complete cessation by all parties to armed conflict of all acts of sexual violence against civilians in line with resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), and 1889 (2009); recruitment and use of children

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and other grave violations and abuses against children in line with resolutions 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009), 1998 (2011) and 2068 (2012); and indiscriminate attacks on civilians in line with resolution 1894 (2009),

Commending the efforts of, and reiterating its full support for, the United Nations/African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the Joint African Union/United Nations Mediation, the United Nations Secretary-General, the African Union High Level Implementation Panel on Sudan, and the leaders of the region to promote peace and stability in Darfur, and expressing strong support for the political process under the African Union/United Nations-led mediation,

Deploring the continued obstacles that have been imposed by the Government of Sudan on the work of the Panel of Experts during the course of its mandate, including delays in the issuance of visas, restrictions to the freedom of movement of the Panel of Experts and UNAMID, and limitations on the Panel of Experts' access to areas of armed conflict and reported violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, while noting the improved interaction between the Focal Point of the Government of Sudan and the Panel of Experts,

Further deploring the three incidents of interference by the Government of Sudan with the work of the Panel of Experts, as set out in paragraphs 20 to 24 of the Final Report of the Panel of Experts (S/2013/79),

Welcoming the enhanced cooperation and information sharing between UNAMID and the Panel of Experts, called for by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations' guidelines and with the assistance of the UNAMID focal point,

Recalling the 24 January 2013 Final Report by the Panel of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 3 (b) of resolution 1591 (2005) and extended by subsequent resolutions, and *expressing* its intent to further study, through the Committee, the Panel's recommendations and to consider appropriate next steps,

Emphasizing the need to respect the provisions of the Charter concerning privileges and immunities, and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, as applicable to United Nations operations and persons engaged in such operations,

Reminding all States, particularly States in the region, of the obligations contained in resolutions 1556 (2004), 1591 (2005), and 1945 (2010) in particular those obligations relating to arms and related materiel,

Stressing the necessity articulated in the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur that all Parties to the armed conflict in Darfur shall fully and unconditionally accept their obligations under international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and relevant Security Council resolutions,

Calling on the Government of Sudan to fulfil all its commitments, including lifting the state of emergency in Darfur, allowing free expression and undertaking effective efforts to ensure accountability for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, by whomsoever perpetrated,

Emphasizing the imperative, highlighted in the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, for all armed actors to refrain from all acts of violence against civilians, in particular vulnerable groups such as women and children, and from violations of

human rights and international humanitarian law and the need to address the urgent humanitarian crisis faced by the people of Darfur, including the guarantee of safe, timely and unrestricted humanitarian access to all areas by humanitarian agencies and personnel,

Noting that acts of hostility, violence or intimidation against the civilian population, including IDPs, in Darfur and other activities that could endanger or undermine the Parties' commitment to a complete and durable cessation of hostilities would be inconsistent with the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur,

Determining that the situation in Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to extend until 17 February 2014 the mandate of the Panel of Experts, originally appointed pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) and previously extended by resolutions 1651 (2005), 1665 (2006), 1713 (2006), 1779 (2007), 1841 (2008), and 1891 (2009), 1945 (2010), 1982 (2011) and 2035 (2012) and requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures, including basing arrangements, as expeditiously as possible;

2. *Expresses* its concern that the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Sudan of technical assistance and support, including training, financial or other assistance and the provision of spare parts, weapons systems and related materiel, could be used by the Government of Sudan to support military aircraft being used in violation of resolutions 1556 (2005) and 1591 (2005), including those aircraft identified by the panel, and urges all States to be mindful of this risk in light of the measures contained in resolution 1591 (2005);

3. *Requests* the Panel of Experts to provide no later than 31 July 2013, a midterm briefing on its work and no later than 90 days after the adoption of this resolution an interim report to the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 3 (a) of resolution 1591 (2005) (hereinafter "the Committee") and a final report no later than 30 days prior to termination of its mandate to the Council with its findings and recommendations;

4. *Requests* the Panel of Experts to provide monthly updates to the Committee regarding its activities, including Panel travel, any obstacles encountered to the fulfilment of its mandate, as well as violations of the sanctions;

5. *Requests* the Panel of Experts to report, in the time frame identified in paragraph 3, on the implementation and effectiveness of paragraph 10 of resolution 1945 (2010);

6. *Requests* the Panel of Experts to continue to coordinate its activities as appropriate with the operations of the United Nations/African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and with international efforts to promote the political process in Darfur, and to assess in its interim and final reports progress towards reducing violations by all parties of the measures imposed by paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution 1556 (2005), paragraph 7 of resolution 1591 (2005), and paragraph 10 of resolution 1945 (2010), progress towards removing impediments to the political process, threats to stability in Darfur and the region, violations of international humanitarian or human rights law or other atrocities, including sexual and gender-based violence and grave violations and abuses against children, and

other violations of the above-mentioned resolutions, and to provide the Committee with information on the individuals and entities that meet the listing criteria in paragraph 3 (c) of resolution 1591;

7. *Regrets* that some individuals affiliated with the Government of Sudan and armed groups in Darfur, continue to commit violence against civilians, impede the peace process, and disregard the demands of the Council, *expresses* its intention to impose targeted sanctions against individuals and entities that meet the listing criteria in paragraph 3 (c) of resolution 1591 (2005), and *encourages* the Panel of Experts, in coordination with the Joint African Union/United Nations Mediation, to provide to the Committee when appropriate the names of any individuals, groups, or entities that meet the listing criteria;

8. *Requests* the Panel of Experts to continue to investigate the role of armed, military, and political groups in attacks against UNAMID personnel in Darfur, and notes that individuals and entities who plan, sponsor or participate in such attacks constitute a threat to stability in Darfur and may therefore meet the designation criteria provided for in paragraph 3 (c) of resolution 1591 (2005);

9. *Expresses* its concern that certain items continue to be converted for military purposes and transferred to Darfur, and urges all States to be mindful of this risk in light of the measures contained in resolution 1591 (2005);

10. *Calls on* the Government of Sudan to remove all restrictions, limitations and bureaucratic impediments imposed on the work of the Panel of Experts, including by issuing timely multiple-entry visas to all members of the Panel of Experts for the duration of its mandate, and by waiving the requirement of Darfur travel permits for said Panel members;

11. *Urges* the Government of Sudan to respond to the Committee's requests on measures put in place to protect civilians in various parts of Darfur, including those affected by new displacements; investigations conducted and accountability measures undertaken for killings of civilians and perpetrators of human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law, including notably the killings of civilians in Abu Zereiga in June 2011, Hashaba in August 2012 and Sigili in November 2012; investigations conducted and accountability measures undertaken for attacks against peacekeepers and humanitarian personnel; and the situation of civilian populations in areas such as eastern Jebel Marra, where the Panel of Experts, UNAMID and humanitarian agencies and personnel have been denied access, and measures taken to allow unimpeded and regular access for humanitarian relief to these areas;

12. *Urges* all States, relevant United Nations bodies, the African Union and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on implementation of the measures imposed by resolution 1591 (2005) and resolution 1556 (2004);

13. *Urges* all States, in particular those in the region, to report to the Committee on the actions they have taken to implement measures imposed by resolutions 1591 (2005) and 1556 (2004), including imposition of targeted measures;

14. *Expresses* its concern that the travel ban and asset freeze on designated individuals is not being implemented by all Member States, and requests the

Committee to respond effectively to any reports of non-compliance by Member States with paragraph 3 of resolution 1591 (2005) and resolution 1672 (2006), including by engaging with all relevant parties;

15. *Expresses* its intention, following the midterm report, to review the state of implementation, including obstacles to full and effective implementation of the measures, imposed in resolutions 1591 (2005) and 1945 (2010), with a view to ensuring full compliance;

16. *Reaffirms* the mandate of the Committee to encourage dialogue with interested Member States, in particular those in the region, including by inviting representatives of such States to meet with the Committee to discuss implementation of the measures and further encourages the Committee to continue its dialogue with UNAMID;

17. *Welcomes* the Committee's work, which has drawn on the reports of the Panel of Experts and taken advantage of the work done in other forums, to draw attention to the responsibilities of private sector actors in conflict affected areas;

18. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

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Letter dated 13 February 2013 from the Permanent Representative to the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to write to you on some international media reports indicating the baseless allegations of arms transfer from the Islamic Republic of Iran to al Shabaab militants in Somalia. These allegations seem to have appeared first in the latest report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia.

In this regard, I wish to bring to your attention, that the allegations on arms transfer from Iran to Somalia are absurd fabrications and have no basis or validity. Thus, it is categorically rejected by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

It is unfortunate that the Monitoring Group has, in an obvious irresponsible manner, put such unfounded allegations and strange fabrications in its report, without first bothering itself to communicate them to my Government. It is further regrettable that the content of the report is leaked to the media for propaganda purposes. This malicious campaign, which is done in the name of the United Nations, endangers the credibility of the Security Council along with that of the United Nations.

It is, therefore, my country's expectation that the Sanctions Committee and the Monitoring Group will address this unfair move and remedy the issue by making the necessary corrective measures.

I would be grateful if you would arrange for the present letter to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammad **Khazaee**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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